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Abstract 
  
 From 1949 to 1950, Paul Blanshard’s American Freedom and Catholic Power dominated 
the New York Times best-seller list for eleven months, having captured the attention of 
American intelligentsia with its claim that “the Catholic problem is still with us” and its call for 
the formation of a “resistance movement.”  Sixty years later, Blanshard’s bigotry is no longer 
defended in educated circles.  Questions remain, though, concerning why Blanshard’s ideas 
made progress in some of the smartest American minds and throughout much of the culture.  
Was Blanshard onto something subversive about Catholics?   Are Catholics’ commitments not 
compatible with the demands of American democratic philosophy and practice?   
Today, some scholars try to solve the Blanshard problem by changing the topic.  “Liberal 
Catholicism,” they intimate, is not the problem posed by the unmodified Catholicism Blanshard 
targeted more than half a century ago.  If, however, we refuse to change the topic (on the ground 
that the Catholic religion has not changed in any relevant sense), the problem is of broader 
scope, as Pope John Paul II wrote in 1991: all those who are “convinced that they know the truth 
and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view.”  Perhaps 
Blanshard was right to the extent he worried that Catholics have principled reservations about the 
scope of democratic legitimacy and the sweep of democratic authority.  It is widely and justly 
celebrated that the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) declared the natural human right to liberty 
of conscience.  What the same Council said about the liberty of the Church, the libertas 
ecclesiae, however, is little noticed, but of at least as much practical significance as what it 
declared about human conscience.  Also little noticed, and also significant, is that the same 
Council said nothing directly about democracy.   
In light of these and other facts, this paper argues that faithful Catholics are indeed 
unreliable from a democratic point of view in the respect that they, in and through their Church, 
insist that the (democratic) socio-political order must be conformed to higher law and true human 
rights (through means that are both prudent and otherwise in conformity with valid positive law).  
Faithful Catholics deny the ultimacy or sufficiency of democracy and what it happens to deliver. 
This paper was originally delivered as the Yves R. Simon Lecture at the University of 
Chicago.  
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ARE CATHOLICS UNRELIABLE FROM A DEMOCRATIC POINT OF VIEW? 
Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul Blanshard’s 
American Freedom and Catholic Power 
 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From 1949 to 1950, Paul Blanshard’s American Freedom and Catholic Power dominated 
the New York Times best-seller list for eleven months, having captured the attention and 
imagination of American intelligentsia and others with its claim that “the Catholic problem is 
still with us” and its clarion for the formation of a “resistance movement” to the Catholic 
hierarchy’s “antidemocratic social policies.”2  People in record numbers did not just read the 
book with the abandon that now greets a new John Grisham novel -- they approved of it, agreed 
with it, even commended it as a work of fact, not fiction or fanaticism.  Distinguished 
contemporary academics reviewed Blanshard’s book in glowing terms.  Writing in The 
Philosophical Review in 1950, John Boas, of The Johns Hopkins University, explained that 
Blanshard “has performed a great service to philosophers . . . .”3  In The Philosophical Quarterly 
in 1952, John Coatman averred that Blanshard’s “treatment is objective, scholarly, and 
restrained.  There are no mere obiter dicta and no judgments without accompanying evidence.”4  
Not to be outdone, John Dewey, Blanshard’s former teacher, praised his pupil’s “exemplary 
scholarship, good judgment, and tact.”  Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell were in favor, too, 
and McGeorge Bundy of Harvard considered the publication of American Freedom and Catholic 
Power “a very useful thing.”5  Someone called Paul Blanshard had succeeded in taking the 
intellectual and cultural temperature of his time.6 
                                                 
1
   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  An 
earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Chicago, as the Yves R. Simon Memorial Lecture, in 
November 2009.  For insightful comments and questions on that occasion, I am especially thankful to R.H. 
Helmholz, Thomas Levergood, and John O’Callaghan.  I owe the suggestion to revisit Blanshard to Levergood.  For 
research assistance I am grateful to Ethan Townsend, Michael Salvati, and Mira Baric.   
2
   PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 347 (2d ed., 1958).  With one exception to be 
noted below, all my citations to this book are to the second edition. 
3
   George Boas, Review of American Freedom and Catholic Power, 59 PHIL. REV. 126, 126-27 (1950). 
4
   John Coatman, American Freedom and Catholic Power and of Blanshard, Communism, Democracy, and 
Catholic Power, 2 PHIL. Q. 284 (1952) (Review of Blanshard). 
5
   See John McGreevy, Thinking on One’s Own: Catholicism in American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, J. 
AM. HIST. 97, 97-98 (Jun. 1997). 
6
   For just a sampling of the further evidence: “Thoughtful Americans will continue to follow the running 
controversy between Blanshard and his critics in spite of the tedium of seemingly endless charges and 
countercharges.”  Stanley Lichtenstein,, My Catholic Critics, 284 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 213 (1952) 
(Review of Paul Blanshard).  “This book is most carefully and completely ‘documented.’ . . .  The book contains an 
immense amount of factual information, and, even when allowance has been made for the bias of the author, 
indicates a situation demanding the serious concern of those who care for democracy and freedom.”  Nathaniel 
Micklem, Review of American Freedom and Catholic Power, 26 INT’L AFF., 143, 143-44 (1950) (Royal Inst. of Int’l 
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Times change, and today Blanshard’s “great service” is generally regarded, when it is not 
swept under the rug, as the apex of bigotry that some knew it to be at its inception.  Sixty years 
after the fact, Blanshard’s contribution is not often defended by the educated.  Indeed, it is 
criticized, including recently by Martha Nussbaum.  “Under cover of [a] calm rational manner,” 
she says, “the book purveys all the familiar tropes of anti-Catholicism.”7  When Nussbaum 
chides Justice John Paul Stevens for “want[ing] all Americans to assimilate,” she is “tempted” to 
call his jurisprudence “Blanshardesque,”8 and people who fear that school vouchers will lead to a 
“religious takeover of education” sometimes become, she says, “Blanshardian.”9  Neither of 
Nussbaum’s neologisms signals a compliment, and I regard Nussbaum’s assessment of 
Blanshard (about which there will be more to say below) as indicative of the current value of his 
stock.     
Questions remain, though, concerning why Blanshard’s ideas made progress in some of 
the sharpest American minds and throughout much of the culture.  Questions also remain 
concerning whether current condemnation of Blanshard supposes that his target has disappeared.  
Still more questions remain, moreover, concerning whether those who today condemn 
Blanshard’s bigotry are prepared to accept the Catholic contribution – a phrase I leave 
intentionally vague for the moment -- to the American experiment in democratic living.  We can 
ask more broadly, furthermore, whether Catholics true to their principles are thus destined to be 
unreliable from a democratic point of view and, if they are, what this means as a practical 
matter.  If Catholics cannot be counted on to be loyal small-d democrats, who is the better for it, 
who the worse?   
What I would like to suggest is that faithful Catholics are indeed, in a specific way, 
unreliable from a democratic point of view, in part because faithful Catholics are never just 
“Catholics;” they are always already “Church,” a corporate limit on the scope and jurisdiction of 
the state.  On the Catholic view, “two there are,” not one, by which we are ruled: State and 
Church, the latter just as capable of ruling, within her sphere, as the former, within its sphere.  I 
would also like to suggest, further, that this fact of dualism and its consequences, which have to 
do with orienting the moral direction of the civil order, are indeed good for all concerned, though 
to appreciate as much one must have a theory of the good, not just of democracy.  If my 
conclusion is not surprising (my title pretty much gives it away, after all), I can at least hope that 
some of my reasons will be of interest, if only because they will seem so outlandish to many.  
And, in a way they should seem outlandish, at least to non-Christians.  As the American Jesuit 
John Courtney Murray once observed, the dualism or diarchy the Church teaches “is not natural; 
indeed its establishment involved a certain dislocation of the natural order, a diminution of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aff.) (book review).  “Paul Blanshard undertakes to denounce the peril [of the “high-pressure methods” of the 
Catholic Church] for the sake of those who choose to ignore it, though either apathy, illusion, or delusion.”   George 
Barrois, Review of American Freedom and Catholic Power, 30 J. RELIGION 76, 76-77 (1950) (book review).  “The 
book by Blanshard . . . was written for popular rather than professional consumption, and is consequently 
journalistic in style.  This is not to suggest that Blanshard is as ignorant and misleading as most journalists are when 
they write of law. To the contrary, Blanshard is a lawyer himself and handles the legal aspects in knowledgeable 
fashion.  But the book is not confined to legal issues.”  William P. Murphy, Religion and the Schools: The Great 
Controversy, 1965 DUKE L.J. 436, 437 (1965) (book review).   
7
   MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY 277 (2008). 
8
   Id. at 294. 
9
   Id. at 298. 
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stature and scope which the political power would have possessed in another, purely natural 
dispensation.”10     
 
 
1.  Just the Facts from Paul Blanshard 
 
 “Abhor that arrant Whore of Rome, And all her blasphemies, And drink not of her cursed 
cup, Obey not her decrees.”  Thus the New England Primer, published in 1688, taught Protestant 
school children to chant.11  Writing close to three centuries later and six decades before today, 
Paul Blanshard concluded his bestselling American Freedom and Catholic Power in these terms: 
“Those who have followed my analysis of the Catholic problem thus far will agree that it is 
already too late to solve the problem by passive measures.  The Catholic hierarchy is not passive. 
. . . It seems clear to me that there is no alternative for champions of traditional American 
democracy except to build a resistance program.”12  Lest he seem to be in the bad taste of the 
nasty old Protestant nativism exemplified by the Primer, Blanshard was sure to distinguish the 
program he championed by insisting upon a complete disjunction between the Catholic people, 
who were fine, and the Catholic hierarchy, who were the enemy:  “It is scarcely necessary to say 
that a resistance movement can have no place for bigots or for enemies of the Catholic people.”  
Scarcely, indeed.  “Nor can it have any place,” Blanshard continued, “for those who would 
curtail the rights of the Catholic Church as a religious institution.  Its sole purpose should be to 
resist the antidemocratic social policies of the hierarchy and to fight against every intolerant or 
separatist or un-American feature of these policies.”13   
The resistance to these “policies,” Blanshard counseled in 1949, “should begin in the 
minds of all democratic-minded Americans, Catholic and non-Catholic . . . .”14  Writing a decade 
later, in an updated version of his bestseller, Blanshard congratulated himself and other 
visionaries: “it is a pleasure to report that the movement has developed more rapidly than I had 
dared to dream. . . .  Yes, the resistance movement is here, and it is growing with remarkable 
momentum.”15  That was not the limit of the new triumphalism.  “At least once in our history,” 
Blanshard reminded his readers in conclusion, “the American people have thrown off an alien 
system of control. . . .  The analogy,” he conceded, “is not exact, but it contains a suggestion and 
a hope for the solution of the Catholic problem in the United States.”16   
 There is no substitute for reading the thousands of pages Blandshard devoted to his 
project, starting in his blockbuster American Freedom and Catholic Power and continuing 
through some dozen more sequel volumes well into the 1970s.  Blanshard’s work is rhetorically 
clever.  Blanshard begins by saying that “[n]o fair-minded man can fail to render homage to the 
Church’s lofty moral purpose . . . .”17  Unlike bigots of days gone by, he is pursuing, he reports, a 
                                                 
10
   John Courtney Murray, SJ, On the Structure of the Church-State Problem, in THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS 11, 12 (Waldemar Gurian & M.A. Fitzsimons eds., 1954). 
11
   John Courtney Murray, S.J., Paul Blanshard and the New Nativism, MONTH 191, 215 (Apr. 1951) (quoting Paul 
Blanshard) 
12
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2 at 346 . 
13
   Id. at 347. 
14
   Id. 
15
   Id. at 348-49. 
16
   Id. at 351-52. 
17
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 4. 
 5 
“documentary approach.”18  Sensing “the duty to speak,” he “began [his] ten years of 
research.”19  Why?  “Many American liberals have been deterred,” Blanshard laments, “from an 
honest analysis of the implications of Catholic rule by being associated with anti-Catholic 
fanatics.”  This is no return of the bigotry of the old Nativism.  In the past, “the bigoted character 
of the sources has tended to divert attention from a valid and important question.”20 Not any 
more, Blanshard promises the reader:  “I have tried in this book to put down plain facts about the 
Catholic question, facts that every American should know.  The method of treatment is self-
evident.”21  What better in a nation dedicated to self-evident truths?  And truths don’t change.  
When Blanshard published the revised version of American Freedom almost a decade after its 
original publication, he added:  “My theses remain unchanged.  The arsenal of factual weapons 
has simply been augmented and modernized to meet changing conditions.”22  The old attack was 
bigotry; the new attack is to be fair.  
 What, then, is the basis of the attack Blanshard assures his readership is fair?  What are 
the “facts” that tell so strongly against the Catholic hierarchy?  Consider the following: 
 
Catholic young women, reared in the free and hearty atmosphere of modern 
America, are beginning to regard the whole segregated system of nuns, wimples, 
and convents as medieval posturing and useless mortification. . . .  In the long run, 
. . . I think that the fundamentally democratic and cooperative outlook of the 
average Catholic layman will triumph over a medieval ecclesiastical machine – 
provided we cherish and develop our public schools.23 
 
This passage is typical not only in its snarkiness but, more important, in its unceremoniously 
making Americanism and democracy -- for Blanshard, the two concepts are virtually convertible 
-- the touchstone.  Without benefit of argument or even a trace of self-consciousness, Blanshard 
proceeds on the assumed basis that what is fundamental to all true Americans is “democracy.”  
In a phrase, the test Catholics flunk when examined by Blanshard is the American commitment 
to democratic fundamentalism.24  As John Courtney Murray explained in his review of the book, 
“[Blanshard’s] own indictment of the Church rests on a different set of premises [than the old 
Nativism, to wit], a new Nativism.  The nativist inspiration,” Murray continues, “is visible in the 
constant use of the adjectives, ‘American’ and ‘un-American,’ as ultimate categories of value, 
                                                 
18
   Id. at 6. 
19
   Id. 
20
   Id. at 302. 
21
   Id. at 4. 
22
   Id. at viii.   “After ten years Blanshard’s thesis remains unchanged. . . .  Judged by normal standards of 
scholarship, the book suffers from  . . . defects. . . .   Blanshard regards his sources as an ‘arsenal’ and his facts as 
‘ammunition.’”  Lynch, supra note 6, at 272. 
23
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 323-24.  “Though in some ways harking back to the days of 
the APA or the Klan, the book also marks a transitional point in the long story of anti-Catholicism.  Blanshard’s 
critique stresses newer ideas, especially the Church’s neglect of the interests of women and its disregard of modern 
attitudes toward sexuality.”  PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 38 
(2003). 
24
   One reviewer summed it up this way:  “Opinions will differ about the validity of Blanshard’s conclusions, both 
as to the extent of Catholic influence in American public life and as to its desirablility.  To those who believe that 
man’s destiny is to be a good American democrat his thesis may be entirely convincing.  Others will notice that his 
conception of democracy presupposes an intolerance and conformity as frightening as the Inquisition.”  Lynch, 
supra note 6, at 272. 
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supplanting the usual categories of true or false, or right or wrong.’”25  Murray does not 
exaggerate, as becomes unmistakably clear in Blanshard’s wind-up in the book’s final chapter:  
“It is apparent . . . that the American Catholic problem is . . . that many of the hierarchy’s social 
and political policies are incompatible with Western democracy and American culture.”26 
 Many are the Catholic hierarchy’s “policies” that fail on the standard of American 
democracy as interpreted by Blanshard.  The book’s chapters are a catalogue of them, and they 
concern everything from schools to “eugenic sterilization,” the latter of which Blanshard 
recommends to combat “overpopulation,” which Blanshard in turn regarded as “the most basic 
and formidable threat to the future happiness of the human race.”27  As a matter of particular 
local color at Villanova University, which is an apostolate of the Order of St. Augustine, I would 
note that Blanshard singles out for special censure one of our own Augustinians of happy 
memory:   
 
The Right Reverend John J. Bonner, diocesan superintendent of schools of 
Philadelphia, boasted in 1941 that the increase in the Catholic births in 
Philadelphia in the preceding decade had been more than 50 per cent higher than 
the increase in the total population.28   
 
Not willing to let well enough alone, Monsignor Bonner went on to predict that Philadelphia 
“will be fifty per cent Catholic in a comparatively short time.”29  A charitable interpretation 
would be that Monsignor was taking the long view of history. 
Returning to Blanshard’s fears about overpopulation simpliciter, Blanshard, having duly 
registered the Church’s unqualified opposition to sterilization, proceeds to deliver the good 
news: “Fortunately, neither the people nor the courts of the United States agree that there is 
anything necessarily wrong in depriving an insane or feebleminded person of the capacity to 
reproduce by a simple and relatively painless operation which does not even deprive him of the 
satisfaction of sex.”30  Noting further that there was only one dissent (and it was without opinion) 
from the Supreme Court judgment that infamously upheld compulsory sterilization, Buck v. Bell, 
and that that lone dissenter was the sole Catholic Justice on the Court, Pierce Butler (a daily 
communicant, by the way)31, Blanshard responds by making his own those unmatched and 
almost unimaginable words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for the Court: “Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”32  Recall, if you haven’t already, that this was also the 
Court of Stone, Brandeis, and Taft.         
If Blanshard found American law happily at odds with “the hierarchy’s” “policy” on 
sterilization, he ruefully admitted that our law and such “policy” are at least somewhat in accord 
                                                 
25
  Murray, New Nativism, supra note 11, at 215-16.  “[V]iewed from the standpoint of later events in North 
American Catholic history, it is now clear that Blanshard’s most important Catholic conversation partner was 
theologian and political theorist John Courtney Murray . . . .”  MARK S. MASSA, S.J., ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN 
AMERICA: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 61 (2003). 
26
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 325. 
27
   Id. at 5. 
28
   Id. at 322. 
29
   Id. 
30
   Id. at 181. 
31
    Joseph Vining, The Resilience of Law, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 151, 163 (H. 
Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009). 
32
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 181. 
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on the question of education.   Observing that since 1925 and the Supreme Court decision in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,33 the right of Catholics to operate and populate their own schools has 
been constitutionally protected, Blanshard then goes on to make the following odd claim:  “The 
American people have no desire to prevent Catholics from having schools of their own.”34  Odd, 
because it is demonstrably false.  After all, the Court would not have had occasion to hear the 
Pierce case if the American people known as Oregonians had not through their elected 
representatives acted to deprive that state’s Catholic citizens of schools “of their own.”  
Democratic majorities sometimes do things that it falls to democratically unaccountable judicial 
actors to undo.  Conversely, it bears mentioning that Blanshard’s popularity coincided with the 
period that set establishment clause jurisprudence on its unhappy course.35     
 There will be more to say about Pierce in due course, but first and foremost there stands 
the architectonic “policy” of which the Pierce issues are really just a subset.     
 
The Church’s philosophy of church and state is far more important than the 
continued existence of a bit of acreage which has its own postage stamps and flag. 
In fact, the philosophy of church and state espoused by the Vatican is the most 
important thing in the whole Catholic system because it determines the political 
and social policies which the bishops and priests will pursue throughout the 
world.36 
 
What, then, is that philosophy? 
 
Underneath all its ponderous verbiage the Catholic theory of church and state is 
quite simple.  It is essentially a variation on the doctrine of the divine right of 
kings. . . .  The divine authority of the Church is paramount in its own sphere 
because the Church is God’s viceregent on earth.  The authority of the state comes 
next and is decidedly secondary. . . .37 
 
 
And finally to the heart of the matter: 
 
In particular areas the authority of the Church is superior to that of the United 
States government and of all governments, and no government is conceded the 
moral right to deny this.  The Pope is a kind of special world monarch who rules a 
synthetic moral empire that overlaps and penetrates the sovereignty of all earthly 
governments.  His special territory is religion, education, and family life, but he 
also has supreme power over a vaguely defined area known as morals.  Also he 
has special and exclusive jurisdiction over any matter which may affect the life of 
the Church either directly or indirectly.38 
                                                 
33
   268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
34
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 112. 
35
   See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 
843-46 (1984) (discussing likely effects of Blanshard’s description of Catholicism on Supreme Court decisions 
under religion clauses). 
36
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 60. 
37
   Id. at 61. 
38
   Id. 
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Blanshard’s formulations here, as elsewhere, leave much to be desired in terms of 
correspondence to anything the popes, Church councils, serious Catholic scholars, or any other 
serious souls have actually said on the matter. There is no honestly denying, however, that 
Blanshard is basically correct that the Church makes a version of this last claim.  Murray 
formulates that claim as follows:  “the Church stands outside the political order and above it, and 
that she has a spiritual authority which, remaining spiritual, may reach into the temporal order, 
there to lay the protective grasp of its authoritative moral judgments on those elements of secular 
life that have a sacred aspect.”39  Blanshard is having none of it.  The claim that the Church 
stands outside and above the state is the thesis Blanshard means above all to deny.  In perhaps 
the most telling clause of the entire book, and one that Murray singled out in his review, 
Blanshard bids the Church “admit that the Church in the social sphere is simply one agency 
within the State.”40  So telling was that clause, in fact, that Blanshard silently dropped it from the 
second edition41, though boasting, as we have already noted, that his theses remained 
“unchanged.”42  Caught.   
 
 
2.  Manufacturing Monism 
 
 One reason for Blanshard’s popularity was that he was preaching to the choir, as they 
say, not just by appealing to anti-Catholic prejudice, but principally by taking hold of and raising 
up a countervailing thesis that had lain lodged, if largely unarticulated, in the then-common 
American mind.  That countervailing thesis, that the Church is simply an agency within the state, 
may sound unfamiliar, a tad extravagant, or even mischievous when stated so baldly.  After all, it 
is not usually spoken in polite society, but this is exactly because by now it is almost taken for 
granted there.  The thesis is entailed, however, by what is spoken in polite society all the time.  
As Russell Hittinger has perceptively observed, “If we ask a modern person who or what is 
sovereign, he or she would not say, ‘reason,’ ‘the individual,’ or ‘science,’ but instead, without 
hesitation, ‘the state.’”43  Do you doubt this?  The Constitution of the United States does not so 
much as mention sovereignty.  As Justice James Wilson, himself a signatory of the Declaration 
of Independence and a framer of the Constitution, wrote in the towering 1793 case of Chisholm 
v. Georgia, in which the state claimed immunity to suit on the ground that it was sovereign and 
above the law: “To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally 
unknown.”44  Today, however, the U.S. Reports are thick with imputations to the states of 
“sovereignty” such that they are immune from unconsented suit by those they may have injured.  
And it is, I would add tangentially, the conservatives on the Court, the erstwhile textualists, who 
have led the charge on behalf of state “sovereignty.”  That charge may be bad as matter of how 
                                                 
39
   Id. at 223. 
40
   Murray, New Nativism, supra note 11, at 221 (quoting Paul Blanshard). 
41
   Compare PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 47 (1st ed., 1949) (clause appearing 
on page 47), with BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 64 (clause missing from equivalent page 64, 
though sentence of which it was originally part remains otherwise in place). 
42
   BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM, supra note 2, at viii. 
43
   Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE  VOL. 1, at 4 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank Alexander eds.,2006). 
44
   2 U.S. 419, 454 (1793). 
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the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted (as I have argued elsewhere)45, but it evinces a 
mentality that is even worse.     
It is, of course, possible to speak both of states and sovereigns in a way that does not 
entail Blanshard’s thesis.  As a matter of history, however, both modern states themselves and 
the discourse of sovereignty, if you will, are traceable in large part to a widening wish for 
monism, a situation in which there is just one plenary power above every nation state.  Hobbes is 
the obligatory citation for this proposition.  And if the power over a given nation state be not 
plenary, as in constitutionally limited governments such as our own, the monist insists that at 
least it should be sole.  Rousseau caught the spirit of this aspiration:  “It is of necessity . . . that 
no partial society should exist in the state.”46   
 How does this happen?  To be concrete, under the French Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
of 1790, Catholic dioceses were all made “departments” of the state and clergy became salaried 
state employees.47  My own favorite example of the way monism is confected, though, comes a 
little later, and it is the Law of Associations or the Waldeck-Rousseau Act passed in France in 
1901 -- and still on the books today.  According to this law, religious orders and congregations 
are required to obtain “authorization” from the state in order to form or to continue to exist and 
operate.  Requests for such “authorization” were frequently denied in the post-1901 period, with 
the intended result that religious orders and congregations were driven into diaspora, their houses 
closed, their hospitals shuttered, their schools emptied, their good works arrested.48  Within a 
short span of time following 1901, hundreds and hundreds of Catholic communities were 
dispersed.    The aspiration to monism is palpable, even when it is achieved a little bit at a time.  
But that is France.  What about the United States?  After all, the Framers “split the atom 
of sovereignty,” as Justice Kennedy explained in the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton case, by 
recognizing the sovereignty both of each of the several states and of the United States.  Again, I 
have written elsewhere about what I regard as the incoherence of taking what was intended to be 
a scalar quantity and then giving it degrees, and I will not repeat that argument here.  It is enough 
to note that this aspect of the Framers’ achievement or aspiration does not solve or even address 
the problem of monism; or, to the extent it does, it does so in the wrong direction.  The reason is 
that what the Framers did, at least aspirationally, was to multiply (sovereign?) state governments.  
The question we are pursuing, by contrast, is whether, in addition to how ever many or few state 
governments there turn out to be (each possessed of a final authority over a particular body 
politic), another final authority stands beside each of them, or perhaps even bestrides each of 
them and all of them.  The question, in other words, is whether humans are arranged under one 
final authority, monism, or under two such authorities, dualism or (better) diarchy. 
As we have already seen, it is Blanshard’s explicit thesis that the Church exists as an 
agency within the political order, not outside it, least of all above it.  Blanshard reaches monism 
not by denying the existence of the phenomenon that people commonly call by the name 
“Church,” but by arbitrarily limiting the Church to what he refers to as the “devotional.”  I say 
“arbitrarily” because Blanshard offers no theory of “church and state” at all, and admits as 
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much.49  Instead, he accuses the American hierarchy of “impos[ing] its own philosophy  of 
church and state on the American concept . . . , a little like a child who, being unable to find the 
appropriate piece to insert in a picture puzzle, jams in the wrong piece loosely. . . .”50  (Just the 
facts from Blanshard).  “[The Church’s] leaders, in full retreat before the expanding conception 
of the democratic state,” he continues, “have kept repeating the unrealistic thesis of Leo XIII, 
that there is a natural ‘orbit’ for church and state and that there are ‘fixed limits’ between the 
orbits. No independent political scientist has ever been able to discover those fixed limits.”51  If 
only such independence could be found.   
Another fact, according to Blanshard, is that the Catholic hierarchy “uses familiar words 
with private meanings. . . .  The bishop begins by including in the concept ‘church’ large areas of 
political, social, and educational life which the non-Catholic regards as part of the normal sphere 
of democratic government.”52  The imagined bishop does indeed include within the meaning of 
Church almost exactly what Blanshard describes.  Blanshard, however, gives said bishop both 
too much credit and too little.  The bishop’s meaning is hardly private.  Nor is the bishop’s only 
the public Catholic meaning.  As one Protestant observed in reviewing Blanshard’s book in the 
Atlantic Monthly in 1950: 
 
It is in this dogmatic confidence that Blanshard takes issue with the Roman 
Catholic Church on the crucial point for all of us:  he judges that church to be a 
sinister threat to the public weal because it “refuses to admit that the Church in 
the social sphere is simply one agency within the State.”  What Blanshard ignores, 
however, is that it is on exactly this point, and this alone, that great empires have 
dashed themselves to pieces against the Christian Church.  This is the point at 
which Christianity has ultimate and final meaning for all nations; this is where an 
avowal of faith in the Christian God meets its last judgment. . . .  The Gospel 
writers profoundly believed that the Church is not simply one agency within the 
State, but that it has an authority above the State.  The Church has believed so 
ever since.  What Blanshard seems unable to comprehend is that both Roman 
Catholics and Protestants accept the Christian view with all the assurance of truth 
evident in the secularist religion, and with equal, if not greater, experience and 
reasoning power, and certainly with as much integrity and candour.53  
 
 
The Christian, not exclusively Catholic, claim made by the imagined bishop originates in the 
Christian revelation and has received public development through centuries of argument ever 
since.  Refined through centuries of public dialogue, the meaning is hardly private.54  To relegate 
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the Church to the sacristy, as Blanshard would do, is to take the side of the argument earlier 
taken by Gallican and Stuart absolutists.  In this respect, some called Blanshard is nothing new 
under the sun.   
 
 
3.  The Church: an “erratic boulder” 
 In the recent Anglophone literature, the rejection of political or state absolutism has often 
sounded in terms of “pluralism. “ In the best of this literature, the claims are both descriptive and 
normative.  The descriptive claim, as by William Galston, is that the social order “consist[s] in a 
multiplicity of spheres, some overlapping, with distinct natures and/or inner norms.”55  Galston 
notes that he is proceeding “empirically” when recognizing “the diverse forms of human 
sociability and association”56 that politics and government must respect (and sometimes 
coordinate).  The normative claim, again to take Galston as our spokesman, is that such 
associations are valuable exactly because they allow individuals to instantiate and share putative 
values/goods that others may not recognize or prefer.57  A violin club, for example, can 
encourage excellence in violin for each of the members in a way that the broader society cannot.   
A further normative argument for associations, though, is that the associating not only 
encourages individual achievements of specific goods or values (a line of good violinists), but 
instead a good or value that cannot be achieved except through association, that is, a group good.  
The Philadelphia Orchestra playing a symphony achieves not just seventy or how-ever-many fine 
and diverse performances, but a symphony.  A crew team in perfect synchronicity produces not a 
number of exemplary performances, but a victory.  As we multiply examples, from soccer teams 
and glee clubs to families and rescue efforts, the normative value of such associations becomes 
unmistakable.  Certain human goods are unachievable in diaspora.  A reason for the state to 
respect (and perhaps encourage) such associations is that they uniquely set the conditions of the 
possibility of achieving certain goods.  If a government wishes to respect and encourage goods 
(as any just government will), it is not enough to respect Mr. Jones; it is also necessary to respect 
Mr. Jones’s associations, at least his morally upright ones.  A state’s respecting a plurality of 
such social forms represents a genuine chink in the monist armor, at least so long as the state 
recognizes that it is truly obligated to respect such non-governmental associations.  
 Pro-pluralism arguments of the sort just elaborated can go a long way toward showing 
why the state should respect the particular association that is the Church.  I wish to emphasize 
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that such arguments can be of great value in a situation of moral and religious heterogeneity such 
as our own.  
 What such arguments miss, however, is that, on the Catholic understanding of the thing, 
the Catholic Church, unlike every other association or potential association,  is a foundation.  
“The Church is ‘founded’ by Christ,” Heinrich Rommen explains; “therefore it is juridically a 
‘foundation,’ not a corporation, and its constitution, its fundamental law, is given directly by God 
and not ordained by the people.  The Church, though she may participate in certain measures in 
the essentials of all societies, is nevertheless, a society sui generis . . .”58  As all American law 
students learn, corporations may alter their particular ends and constitutions, and may be 
regulated by the civil authority.  Not so the Church, however, as Rommen goes on to explain:  
“The Church’s end and constitution are absolute, always the same, above civilizations and 
historical periods.”59 
 Needless to say, throughout the more than two thousand years of the Church’s history, 
the Church has faced governments of varied kinds, and the Church has negotiated different kinds 
of relationships depending upon the particular aspirations and claims of said governments.  The 
Church is more than familiar with the sort of state that would subordinate the Church to itself.  In 
response, the Church asserts, in the language of the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on 
Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae, what is necessary for her to achieve the end that is hers 
from her founder:  
 
The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle governing relations 
between the Church and public authorities and the whole civil order.  As the 
spiritual authority appointed by Christ the Lord, with the duty imposed by divine 
command, of going into the whole world and preaching the Gospel to every 
creature, the Church claims freedom for herself in human society and before 
every public authority.60   
 
Whereas Dignitatis humanae “proceeds cautiously on other questions,”61 including the one for 
which it is best known, viz., the right to freedom of individual conscience, on the question I am 
pursuing here, by contrast, the Declaration is decisive:  “Among those things which pertain to 
the good of the Church, . . .  things which must everywhere  and at all times be safeguarded and 
defended from all harm, the most outstanding surely is that the Church enjoy that freedom of 
action which her responsibility for the salvation of men requires.  This is a sacred liberty with 
which the only-begotten Son of God endowed the Church . . . .  [T]o attack it is to oppose the 
will of God.”62  
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 In the tradition of political theory descending from Aristotle, the polis or any of its later 
alternatives, including the nation state, is said to be a societas perfecta, that is, a self-sufficient 
society dependent for its complete existence and persistence on no other society.  As the Church 
contended against states that would subordinate her to themselves, the Church appropriated the 
conceptual armature of the societas perfecta for herself.63  This claim is evident in the Code of 
Canon Law (1983).64  Canon 113 section 1 asserts: “The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See 
have the status of a moral person by divine ordinance itself.”65  Canon 1254 section 1 asserts: 
“To pursue its proper purposes, the Catholic Church by innate right is able to acquire, retain, 
administer, and alienate temporal goods independently from civil power.”66  And canon 1311 
provides: “The Church has the innate and proper right to coerce offending members of the 
Christian faithful with penal sanctions.”67  Though it is not in the nature of a “penal sanction,” 
one might mention here the clergy’s responsibility, set out in canon 915, to safeguard the 
Catholic community by denying Holy Communion to those Catholics who scandalize the faithful 
by persisting in manifest grave sin.68  Whereas the headlines complain of bishops’ “politicizing 
the Eucharist” by denying holy communion to, for example, a resolutely “pro-choice” elected 
official, the Church understands herself in that context to be, among other things, protecting her 
own unity or communion, with any effect on the body politics – that is, on the functioning of that 
other societas perfecta – as simply an unintended, though perhaps anticipated, consequence.     
 With all due respect to them, ordinary, run-of-the-pew Catholics have no clue that the 
Church makes the claims I have just enumerated, which shows, among other things, that the 
contrary message coming from the culture of monism has enjoyed impressive success.  These are 
the Church’s claims, though, and with respect to them Blanshard was, I would like to suggest, 
too clever by half.  His hysterical myopia with respect to the hierarchy led him to overlook the 
fact, which presumably he would have found even more disturbing, that the hierarchy and the 
laity cannot be pried apart.  Whereas Blanshard opined that “[i]n a very real sense the Catholic 
Church is the clergy,” the reality is that the Church is the entire People of God hierarchically 
arranged by divine foundation: Pope, bishops, priests, deacons, and the lay faithful.69  Whereas 
Blanshard worries that the Church as he defines it (that is, “the hierarchy”) commands 
individuals who are extrinsic to it (the laity), the reality is that the Church is, on her own 
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understanding, a societas perfecta with her own internal norms, including a legal and penal 
system.  Whereas for Blanshard, shaped in the Congregationalist tradition, “‘church’ . . . 
represented an essentially private and voluntary form of religious organization, centered on piety 
and worship, in which the power and authority are formed ‘from the bottom up,’”70 the reality is 
that the Catholic Church understands herself to be a public association formed, by her divine 
founder, from the top down.  Indeed, what has been “most important for [the Church in the 
modern world] was that the Church could be differentiated [from the states which wished to 
dominate it] without reducing itself to the status of other private associations.”71 
 John Finnis once memorably (if dismissively) described Aristotle’s argument from the 
“function” of natural kinds in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 as an “erratic boulder”72 on an otherwise 
clean field of moral argument.  What I would like to suggest is that the Church’s claims on her 
own behalf testify to the presence in what would otherwise be our monistic midst of an erratic 
boulder of an irreducibly associational sort, a foundation.  It is not just “Catholics,” then, as if 
one could size them up them seriatim and thus have taken the measure of the matter, that pose a 
threat.  The threat we are talking about, we should recall, is the one Blanshard fingered but could 
not quite describe.  The threat is that there is indeed a self-assertive imperium within the 
democratic imperium, the former claiming to limit (though not to de-legitimate) the latter.  The 
threat, then, is not simply “hierarchy” who speak on behalf of a foreign potentate; it is, rather, a 
Church that, speaking and acting in all the ways that this particular Church does speak and act, 
both through individuals holding specific offices and through ecumenical councils and national 
conferences, claims not to be foreign but at least as local and real as any county or state could 
hope to be.  The Church, as a universal spiritual society not dependent on the concession or 
recognition of Caesar, stands as a bolder in the path of monism.73 
 
 
4.  Power over the Res Sacra Homo 
 
 If metaphors sometimes assist thought, they also sometimes block thought.  The Church 
as bolder illuminates the Church as a unity, a spiritual authority that claims, first, the right to the 
freedom to teach, rule, and sanctify her members, and, second, by negative implication from the 
first, the right to an immunity from politicization, including by subordination to the state.  All of 
this is the first aspect of the principle known as libertas ecclesiae, the liberty of the Church, 
which the Second Vatican Council asserted in the strongest possible terms.  The other aspect of 
that same freedom, obscured by the metaphor, is the right of the Church as the people of God, as 
Murray explains, “to have access to the teaching of the Church, to obey her laws, to receive at 
her hands the sacramental ministry of grace, and to live within her fold an integral supernatural 
life.”74  But that is not all that the freedom of the people of God requires, as Murray goes on to 
elaborate:  “the inherent suprapolitical dignity of this life itself claims ‘for the faithful the 
enjoyment of the right to live in civil society according to the precepts of reason and 
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conscience.’”  Murray continues: “And this comprehensive right, asserted within the political 
community, requires as its complement that all the intrapolitical sacredness (res sacra in 
temporalibus) be assured of their proper immunity from politicization.”75  Where the metaphor 
limps is in failing to suggest that the people of God living their Christian lives in civil society 
must insist that their sacred things be treated as sacred.  This second aspect of the freedom of the 
Church, the freedom of the people of God in the world, provides nothing less, Murray concludes, 
than “the ultimate directive principle of government, . . . mobilizing the moral consensus of the 
people and bringing it to bear upon the [public] power, thus to insure that the king, in the fine 
phrase of John of Salisbury, would ‘fight for justice and the freedom of the people.’”76 
 To be more specific, the thesis, which, as Murray comments, “had all the newness of 
Christianity itself,”77 is that the Church possesses by right a power over the sacred aspects of 
man in the world  -- that is, not just over the Word of God, the sacraments, and the Christian law, 
but the sacredness of man’s life in civil society, specifically, as Murray elaborates: 
 
Man’s relation to God and to the Church, the inner unity of the human personality 
as citizen and Christian but one man, the integrity of the human body, the 
husband-wife relationship, the parent-child relationship, the political obligation, 
the moral values inherent in economic and cultural activity as aspects of human 
life, the works of justice and charity which are the necessary expressions of the 
human and Christian spirit, and finally that common patrimony of ideas which are 
the basis of civilized life – the ideas of law and right, of political power, and the 
obligations of citizenship, of property, etc.78 
 
The claim with respect to this second aspect of the freedom of the Church, then, is that the sacred 
power of the Church has been established to advocate, indeed to insist upon, the secular order’s 
reflecting in appropriate ways the truths about man in the world, what Blanshard regarded as so 
many odious “policies.”  In the words of the Second Vatican Council, which follow immediately 
upon its declaration of the fundamentality of the libertas ecclesiae:   “The Church also claims 
freedom for herself as a society of men with the right to live in civil society in accordance with 
the demands of the Christian faith . . . .”79 
 The history of modern political thought and practice, to which Blanshard was the largely 
unwitting heir, is nothing short of the history, in identifiable but frequently overlapping stages, of 
the rejection of the freedom of the Church as a structural and directional principle in a free 
society.  In its beginning, the rejection addressed only the truth of divine revelation and, 
therefore, the truth of the matter concerning the Church’s being more than an agglomeration of 
consenting souls.  At that stage, the constructive alternative was to install the individual 
conscience as the sole criterion of political or any other legitimacy.  As Murray exlains, “[t]he 
only sovereign spiritual authority would be the conscience of the free man.  The freedom of the 
individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed, would supply the armature of immunity to the 
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sacred order, which now became, by modern definition, precisely the order of private 
conscience.”80   
If this seems to be a bit of stretch, consider that the book in which Martha Nussbaum 
criticizes Blanshard bears the unmistakably modern title Liberty of Conscience.  The book 
aspires to be a qualified defense of our American law of religious liberty, and for Nussbaum it 
turns out to be essentially about freedom of conscience, not at all about freedom of the Church or 
churches.  Even those who, unlike Nussbaum, favor church autonomy and the liberty of the 
Catholic Church have to admit that American constitutional law probably does not include, at 
least not yet, the principle of libertas ecclesiae.81  In sum, the denial of group rights which is 
definitive of the modern political project has been part and parcel of the modern rejection of the 
Church as something more than an assembly of individual consciences, sort of like a sacred 
railway platform.  To return to the Pierce case, the Court reached the right result, but this was 
not because the Court recognized a principle of libertas ecclesiae.   The opinion’s obscure 
reasoning is what you get, on a good day, when the liberty of the Church is not in your 
conceptual arsenal. 
   So much for the first stage.  In the second stage of the rejection of the liberty of the 
Church, the system of moral values that Christianity had articulated as reflecting man’s 
sacredness, values which, by the way, were adopted as the basis of modern political life -- these 
are now to be known as “simply immanent in man. . . .  These values are now simply a human 
possession, a conquest and achievement of humanity by man himself.”82  Martha Nussbaum is 
again exemplary: “If we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for value as 
uninteresting or irrelevant to human ethics, as we should, then the news of its collapse will not 
change the way we think and act.  It will just let us get on with the business of reasoning in 
which we were already engaged.”83  More recently, Professor Nussbaum has embellished this 
theme in an interview in the New York Times Magazine:  “I converted to Judaism when I got 
married.  I had kind of gotten to the end of my rope with Christian otherworldliness.  I wanted a 
religion in which justice was done in this world.”84  Why Professor Nussbaum supposes that the 
God of Christian revelation does not command his rational creatures to do justice to one another, 
especially the least among us, I can only speculate. 
In the third stage, many of those values are themselves rejected, though people continue 
to talk in terms of individual rights that are both swords and shields, claims and immunities.  
Here one need do no more than recollect the description of contemporary moral discourse 
elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in 1984 in After Virtue.  In the fourth stage, which I do not 
believe Murray lived long enough to anticipate, it is contended, quite stunningly, that “immunity 
from a ‘correct anthropology’ is itself a justiciable natural right.”85  This, of course, is 
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exemplified above all in Lawrence v. Texas, which has been described gleefully, including by 
serious intellectuals, as Justice Kennedy’s “libertarian revolution.”86    
 Writing in 1960, Murray observed that “[i]t was an essential part of modernity’s hope 
that the moral consensus upon which every society depends for its stability and progress could be 
sustained and mobilized in terms of a fortunate coincidence of individual private judgments, 
apart from all reference to a visibly constituted spiritual and moral authority.” He then 
immediately asked: “Has this hope proved valid?”  Lawrence, I think, requires a negative 
answer.87 
 Lawrence and its programmatic mentality are not, however, the last word.  The Church 
has not vanished as Blanshard and the other resistance-movement rejecters of the dualist thesis 
had hoped.  The Church knows exactly what we are up against.  Writing in 1991 in the encyclical 
Centesimus annus, Pope John Paul II explained that “[a]uthentic democracy is possible only in a 
state ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person.”88  John Paul 
already knew, though, that it was perhaps too little too late.  Writing just four years later in the 
encyclical Evangelium vitae, John Paul tells the story of the “betrayal,” a term he uses six times 
in the document, by the constitutional democracies of their duty to uphold human rights, 
beginning with the right to life.89   
What is to be done?  Gone are the days in which the Church, cooperating sometimes in 
something approaching monism, could directly impose the truth on society. No worries there.  
John Paul and now Pope Benedict XVI sound the same note when they say, echoing Murray and 
Jacques Maritain of two generations ago, that the Church’s influence must now be achieved 
“indirectly, through evangelization and education of society itself.”90  On this there is agreement, 
and on it the hope for human rights and social justice rests.  The resulting situation is not entirely 
healthy, however, because, as John Paul II also observed in Centesimus, those who are 
“convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a 
democratic point of view.”91  Pope Benedict sees the same problem.  Here, for example, is what 
he said during his 2008 visit to the United States: “Have you noticed how often the call for 
freedom is made without even referring to the truth of the human person?  Some today argue that 
respect for the freedom of the individual makes it wrong to seek the truth, including the truth 
about what is good.  In some circles to speak of truth is seen as controversial or divisive, and 
consequently best kept in the private sphere.”92 
In contemporary political theory, the indictment of those who would shape politics and 
law on the basis of what they regard as a correct anthropology often proceeds from the premise 
that it violates the requirement of “public reason,” which in turn is understood as those minima 
on which agreement can in principle be expected.  I have recently written about this elsewhere 
                                                 
86
   Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV.  21 
(2003). 
87
   “Once the source of meaning and value came to reside exclusively in the human subject, as it did in the modern 
age, any possibility of reaching a consensus on the common good beyond that of creating an environment conducive 
to individual self-realization became extremely difficult.”  Louis Dupre, The Common Good and the Open Society, 
in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 172, 188-89 (R. Bruce Douglass 
& D. Hollenbach eds., 2002). 
88
   POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS , ¶ 46 (1991). 
89
   Hittinger, Introduction, supra note 43, at 32. 
90
   Id. 
91
   POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 88.  See Hittinger, Introduction, supra note 43, at 33. 
92
   POPE BENEDICT XVI, Address to Seminarians (Apr. 19, 2008). 
 18 
and will not repeat the argument here, except to say by way of summary that the “principle of 
equal respect” is said by some to require the exclusion from law and politics of even those moral 
judgments on which a convergence of opinion has in fact been achieved in the democratic 
process, as in the statute held unconstitutional in Lawrence.  Yet again Professor Nussbaum is 
exemplary:  “The hope is that public institutions can be founded on principles that all can share, 
no matter what their religion.”93  The political descended from Rawls wishes on principle to limit 
the political to the uncontroversial, and the remnant is relegated to the private sphere.  Pope 
Benedict saw the trouble with this.  
 
 
5.  The Church, Change and “Democracy” 
 More commonly than through political liberalism enacted into law, though, it is, as 
Murray referred to it, an “idolatry of the democratic process” itself that carries the day, and it is 
to this theme that I would like to return.  As we have already observed, Blanshard considered it 
sufficient to convict the Church (or anybody else) to point out that she was “undemocratic.”  The 
Church is an easy target here.  It is as true now as it was when Blanshard wrote that the Catholic 
Church is simply not a democracy; the divinity of her founder assured as much.  Blanshard was 
especially vexed that the undemocratic Church he knew did not find in herself the will to 
commend to the architects of the political realm the democratic form of government in 
unqualified terms.  “You cannot find in the entire literature of Catholicism,” Blanshard 
complained, “a single unequivocal endorsement by any Pope of democracy as a superior form of 
government.”94  That was true when Blanshard wrote, and, to the best of my knowledge, it 
remains true to this day.   
A little appreciated fact is that the Second Vatican Council was utterly silent on the topic 
of democracy.95  Even Blanshard, who attended the Council (he received a personal invitation 
from Pope John XXIII), seems to have overlooked this pregnant silence, distracted as he was by 
the Council fathers’ violation (as he called it) of the principle of separation of church and state, 
their failure to take control and revoke the “policy” against artificial contraception, and the list 
that goes on for more than three hundred pages in the book modestly titled Paul Blanshard on 
Vatican II.  “I am often asked,” he writes in that book’s preface, “[h]ave you changed your 
opinion about the Catholic Church? The answer is ‘Yes,’” he continues, “but only to the extent 
that the Catholic Church has changed. I am as hostile as I ever was to the autocracy of its central 
power structure and to many of the family and church-state policies that flow from that clerical 
autocracy.”96 
 The thought that the Church changed at Vatican II is crucial to my central topic -- 
whether Catholics are unreliable from a democratic point of view -- because it is sometimes 
supposed that those changes render Blanshardism obsolete by removing its target.97  Martha 
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Nussbaum, in her takedown of Blanshard, comments that “it is remarkable that Blanshard, a 
leading public intellectual, seems utterly unfamiliar with liberal Catholicism, as exemplified in 
the work of [Jacques] Maritain and [John Courtney] Murray . . . .”  Blanshard, for his part, was 
far from ignorant of the work of those two men, yet interestingly he does not group them 
together.  Maritain, though described by Blanshard as among “the most eminent Catholic 
scholars,”98 is excoriated for holding the Catholic position we have already considered, which 
Maritian states as follows: “It is sufficient that the Pope should consider that a sufficiently 
spiritual interest is involved in any temporal arrangement for an intervention by him in regard 
thereto to be legitimate.”99  Blanshard does, however, show no familiarity with Maritain’s later 
judgment that no civil government should privilege any church, lest the equality of citizens be 
disrespected and the common good thus violated.100 
 Murray is a more interesting case here because he managed to fool Blanshard where 
Maritain had not.  In American Freedom and Catholic Power, Blanshard first mocks Murray for 
holding, as he expressed in the Jesuit magazine America in 1947, that “Separation of church and 
state .  .  . [is] that negative, ill-defined, basically un-American formula, with all its overtones of 
religious prejudice.”  Blanshard then immediately adds, in the revised version published almost a 
decade after the first edition, that “Father Murray later became the most advanced of the ‘liberal’ 
Jesuit leaders in advocating accommodation of Catholic policy to American values.”  Later in the 
same revised edition, Blanshard even described as “rather devious and ambiguous theses” 
“Father Murray’s rather pleasing attempt to‘re-interpret’ out of existence some of the more 
flagrant anti-freedom doctrines of the Papacy,” but cautioned that Murray’s “analysis represents 
nothing more substantial than scholarly wishful thinking” and that “few students of Catholicism 
will trust the Jesuits to reform their Church.”101 
Less than a decade later, however, in a volume modestly titled Paul Blanshard on 
Vatican II, the author had to change his tune, explaining that “the star of the American delegation 
[to Vatican II] was John Courtney Murray, whose chief function was to give the pedestrian 
bishops the right words with which to change some ancient doctrines without admitting that they 
were being changed.  He built verbal bridges to the modern world very effectively . . . .”102  
Referring to the Council’s teaching, in the Declaration on Religious Liberty, on the right of the 
individual human person to religious liberty, Blanshard concluded: “The final statement on 
religious liberty was an important achievement.  It will make the struggle for religious liberty 
throughout the world easier.  From now on every libertarian can cite an official Catholic 
pronouncement endorsing the principle of liberty.”103  Blanshard even gave Murray credit for 
those parts of the Declaration that were written in “majestic prose.”  As Blanshard goes on to 
criticize portions of the Declaration, including the one that holds that under certain cultural 
circumstances the civil government can, pace Maritain, properly give the Catholic Church 
special civil recognition104, he altogether overlooks, no doubt because he simply could not 
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comprehend, the portions, discussed above, on the liberty of the Church as the “fundamental 
principle” governing Church-state relations.  Fooled. 
 Had the Church changed her teaching on the liberty of the individual conscience?  Some 
say yes, some say no – the question of whether Church doctrine “changes” is heavily freighted in 
theology and ecclesiology.  The Church teaches that the doctrine had “developed,” and the exact 
theological issue – as between “change” and “develop” -- need not detain us here.105  What is 
crucial is that, in addition to affirming the traditional principle of the liberty of the Church, the 
Council did also affirm the right of individual religious liberty, the right, as it is often and aptly 
called, to follow one’s conscience.  The same Council, however, taught that the state of course 
enjoyed the right, because it enjoyed the duty, to structure political society, through law where 
necessary or desirable, according to a correct anthropology, without any limit to what is 
“uncontroversial.”  No individual is to be coerced in matters of belief, but correlatively the state 
is to uphold the demands of a social order consistent with the natural law and natural human 
rights, doing so, of course, as the tradition has always taught, with regnative prudence.  On this 
the Church had not changed, and whether one calls the result liberal, conservative, mixed, or 
none of the above, nothing called “democracy” was at hand to exempt either individuals or 
whole cultures from the demands of the natural moral law and of respect for human rights.  The 
Church would no longer co-govern the political sphere with the emperor (as she sometimes had 
in the past), but in the words of the Council’s Declaration on the Church in the Modern World, 
Gaudium et spes, the work of the laity is this: “to impress the divine law on the affairs of the 
earthly city.”106  Are people engaged in such work unreliable from a democratic point of view? 
 
Conclusion 
I more than recognize that “[t]he democratic idea is close to nonnegotiable in today’s 
world,”107 as my old teacher, Ian Shapiro, observed a few years back in taking stock of 
contemporary democratic theory.  The idea, though, is a protean and malleable one, and even 
more ambiguous is the expression “from a democratic point of view,” which I have borrowed 
from Pope John Paul II’s observation, which I quoted above, that those are “convinced that they 
know the truth and firmly adhere to it are unreliable from a democratic point of view.”  One 
sense of “democracy” or “democratic,” the one favored by Jacques Maritain, refers to a 
participatory political structure based on human rights.  Faithful Catholics today, I believe, can 
be proud to say that they are reliably democratic in this sense.  Recent popes, though sounding 
the notes of caution I have mentioned, have been fulsome in their defense of participatory 
governing structures and human rights and, in this context (among others), democracy.108 
Another sense of “democracy” or “democratic” refers to majoritarianism and the 
(virtual?) sufficiency of a political majority’s collective decision.  This latter sense of 
“democracy” is frequently linked up with the other idea that the people, even when they are not 
                                                 
105
   See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 300-31  (1998);  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 193-222  (2005). 
106
 See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN 
WORLD, GAUDIUM ET SPES no. 43 (1965); see also LUMEN GENTIUM, 31. 
107
   IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (2003). 
108
   See, e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE 
CHURCH 103, 106, 158, 169, 187, 190, 233, 339, 395, 406-08, 417, 424, 572 (2004).  “The  pleasure the Catholic 
might find in mocking growing lists of human rights is dimmed when he finds the Magisterium addressing him with 
the same language.”  Ralph McInerny, Natural Law and Human Rights, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 12 (1991). 
 21 
(nearly) unanimous, are sovereign.  When Justice Wilson denied that the American people 
undertook to create sovereign states, he did so in part on the ground that the people had reserved 
the sovereignty to themselves.  In the Constitution, Justice Wilson explained in Chisholm, “they 
might have announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely 
conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.”109  With this assumed “fact,” I 
believe, faithful Catholics cannot agree. 
 Why? Sovereignty is a word I try not to use, except when referring to the Almighty.  It 
tends – indeed, is designed – to short-circuit careful argument about ruling authority.  This is no 
doubt a reason for the word’s popularity.  Among the word’s meanings are, first, that its 
possessor has complete (as opposed to partial) authority over something or other,  and, second, 
that its possessor is above (as opposed to subject to) the law.  Obviously, the two meanings are 
related, but they are distinct.  For all the reasons I have been developing, the fact of the Church 
stands as a denial of the first claim; the political “sovereign” does not enjoy plenary jurisdiction 
over the human person.  And the Church herself teaches, moreover, why the second meaning is 
also false: There are no lawless pockets in history, though there are of course instances and even 
epochs of disobedience.   
A defining claim of a putative sovereign is that he (or she or they) are not under law.  
With variations that do not here matter, this is the sense in which Jean Bodin, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau used the term, and the idea is always that the “sovereign” is not bound by law unless 
and until he voluntarily puts himself under law.  But the Church teaches that there is no time, no 
place when “the people” are not under law.  The Catholic contribution to the political sphere 
includes the claim that we are all, each of us and all of us collectively, always under the divine 
natural law, which, though divine in its promulgation, is known by the use of our natural powers 
of intelligence.  This is the law on the basis of which human law can be made; this is the law that 
gives us our natural rights; this is the law that provides the basis for criticizing and perhaps 
disobeying human laws that are in fact perversions of law through their violations of human 
rights and their deprivations of what is good for humans.  The person who objects to a perversion 
of law on the basis of the divine natural law is not engaging in the simple self-assertion or 
aesthetic preference that is sometimes the modern way; rather, he or she is reaching a legal 
judgment according to a real law of divine provenance.  This, the Catholic position, is radical 
doctrine, as rulers who have been faced with it throughout history have discovered.110  Law does 
not begin with the human ruler, but instead both makes possible and delimits such ruling.111  This 
is good not just for Catholics but for all concerned.        
The not-so-hidden agenda of modernity and post-modernity has been, though, in the 
words of Remi Brague, “the reduction of the idea of law to a purely human phenomenon.”112  As 
Brague goes on to observe, “There is nothing to prove that the Western conception of the 
political is secure, or even viable in the long run.  Whether human action can unfold freely, with 
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no reference to the divine, rather than losing its way in suicidal dialectics, remains to be seen.”113  
Meanwhile, though, the Catholic Church and Catholic persons remain at hand to remind us all 
that there is a higher law according to which we and our artifacts are to be judged (in terms of 
whether they are good for us).  It is not surprising that Paul Blanshard was especially disturbed 
by the Catholic claim that democratically enacted law is not necessarily binding.  As Blanshard 
says, “the word ‘defy’ is not contained in the Papal encyclicals, but the word ‘resist’ is there, and 
its meaning is unmistakable.”114  Indeed it is.  As Blanshard also says, “[i]f the hierarchy once 
conceded that ultimate sovereignty lies wholly in the people, anything might follow.”115  Right 
again, Blanshard.  In sum, and to quote Murray:  “[A]s indictments of the Church go, Mr. 
Blanshard’s is not very substantial.”116 
Are Catholics unreliable from a democratic point of view?  It is devoutly to be hoped that 
they will be in the second, that is, the Blanshardian, sense I have just identified: by their insisting 
and acting to ensure, through prudent means and otherwise in conformity with valid positive law, 
that the state and its laws be measured and shaped according to the terms of higher law, the law 
that gives us our natural human rights.117     
What, finally, of the predictable and important objection that what I am suggesting invites 
social conflict? 118  In answer to this question, I will close by quoting Blanshard on something 
Hilaire Belloc said: 
 
Some Catholic authorities are frank enough to admit that the conflict goes back to 
an irreconcilable difference between the Church and American democracy in their 
attitudes toward governmental power.  Hilaire Belloc called it a “necessary 
conflict between the Civil State and the Catholic Church where the two are not 
identified.”  He then went on to say: “The Catholic Church is in its root principle 
at issue with the Civic definition both of freedom and authority.  For the purpose 
of the State, religion is either a universally admitted system, or a matter of 
individual choice.  But by the definition which is the very soul of Catholicism, 
religion must be for the Catholic First, a supreme authority superior to any claims 
of the State; Secondly, a corporate thing, and not an individual thing; Thirdly, a 
thing dependent upon authority, and not upon a personal mood; Fourthly, a 
guarantee of individual freedom in all that is not of faith.”  Belloc admits that 
these principles are in fundamental conflict with the American outlook, and he 
predicts that a struggle that “will seem monstrous” may develop . . .   For once, I 
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think Mr. Belloc was a good prophet.  The signs of the “monstrous” conflict 
which he predicted are all about us.119 
 
Indeed they are, Mr. Blanshard; indeed they are.  May you rest in peace. 
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